SAFA Skysailor Magazine

28 SKY SAILOR March | April 2020 U nfortunately, the rumour mill springs into action whenever a fatal accident occurs. Understandably, our members want to know what has occurred, and also if there is something they should know about that might affect their flying. The SAFA Operations Team have a procedure we follow with each accident involving a fatality. In the initial stages, we inform the members of the event in an Airwaves communiqué from the President. From that point, we only release information after the relevant Coroners Court has concluded their proceedings and inquiries. This can take considerable time, months, even years. However, if there is an urgent safety issue regarding a site, procedure, or equipment, the Chief Operations Officer will issue information regarding the immedi- ate actions that are being taken. We understand that some members may find this slow release of information annoying, but you need to understand that there is a due process to be followed. Recently, we had communications from the Coroners Court in NSW informing us that they had concluded their proceedings involving the fatal accident of Michelle Uildriks (AIRS #1013). From the report (AIRS #1013) On 5 March 2019, Michelle (PG3) was flying on her own at Mt Borah, near Manilla in NSW, launching at 14.43 AEDT. The weather at the time was light to moderate SW winds and thermic activity. Following soaring for 5 minutes after launching from the West launch, Michelle flew south along the west face, then turned left around the southern end via the ‘saddle’ on a standard flight path heading east towards the East LZ. Michelle was observed by another pilot walking up the east side of Borah; he saw her glider take and recover from a large asymmetric collapse. This was determined by the track log to be located 500m SE of the Mt Borah East launch. This was most likely from a lee side thermal. She then flew directly east towards the Mt Borah East LZ. The flight path was around the southern and eastern perimeter of the East LZ on a steady descent left hand circuit approach passing adjacent to and around the windsock located in the centre of the large field. Based on GPS track log data of the glider’s ground speeds, the wind in the LZ was consistent nil-light SW with no thermals or shearing present. The left turn from downwind was initiated late from a height of approx. 30m agl, approx. 40m north of the northern perimeter fence of the LZ and over a moderate erosion gully with sparse large eucalyptus trees. The initial part of the 180º turn was at the standard rate of 15 sec/360º. Ground speed GPS data does not indicate any significant tailwind at any stage to give reason for such a late turn. The pilot had passed along the entire eastern edge of the LZ with no obstructions or traffic which afforded an easy and timely po- tential 150º turn onto a standard final approach into wind with ample room. During the slowly tightening left turn from about 20m AGL, the G-force and sink rates measured increased rapidly within 3 seconds as the heading change went from W to SW. G-force went from 1.2G to a peak of 4.1G, while at the same time the sink rate increased from 2.1m/s to 6.7m/s. Both values decreased to 1.2G and 0.8m/s respectively 3 seconds later, at the approximate moment of impact. The impact with terrain occurred at 14.53 AEDT. That evening, there was some confusion as to Michelle’s location; there was a suggestion reported she had been seen heading into town. Consequently, she was not reported missing until the next morning when a search was initiated, and the crash location identified an hour later. The evidence at the site indicates that the reserve was not deployed, there was no damage to the helmet and the back protection in the harness was intact. The decreasing G-force and sink rates noted towards the impact moment suggest a pendular arc flight path in a left-hand turn. This could arise from two possible scenarios: 1. The pilot was increasing the turn rate in the last part of the turn to make it back around to land in the LZ, but was faced with two large trees in the way with treetops at approximately the same altitude as the pilot. With increasing G-force, the pilot realised the potential of a spin or spiral dive and let up the brakes completely creating a rapid onset forward pitching down-plane exit/dive with subsequent pendular swing through as the EN-A certified glider auto-recovered. 2. The pilot encountered a large asymmetric collapse on the inside wing part of the way through the turn resulting in a standard (for an EN-A certified glider) dive recovery (in the absence of pilot input) and thus a pendular swing through. This scenario is believed less likely than the first since the inside wing would have been loaded and neither the GPS ground speeds or vario sink rates indicate any thermal activity present around that time. The decreasing G-force and sink rate towards the end also categorically rule out that the pilot was in a spiral dive turn all the way to the impact point. Without an eyewitness account, or being able to talk to Michelle, we’ll never be able to say with certainty what occurred. The Ops Team and Board would like to thank AIRS Manager, GodfreyWenness, for his analysis of the available flight log data and conduct of operations at the time of the accident. Again,thestaffandBoard,andI’msure,theentire membership of SAFA, would like to pass on our deepest condolences to Michelle’s family and friends. AIRS Wrap-up – January 2020 Hi folks, welcome to 2020. The report reviews we’ve completed recently are a bit of a mixed bag, but I want to concentrate on two, and warn you of some consequences to finish with. by Iain Clarke, Safety Management Officer